Showing posts with label financial crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label financial crisis. Show all posts

Thursday, July 09, 2009

Getting to the Source of Systemic Risk

Recent articles on the US and world economic crisis have often been focused on the concept of ‘systemic risk’. For example, Robert Pozen, author of Too Big to Save?, argues in The Wall Street Journal (7/9/09) that the Federal Reserve ought to be given the job of monitoring systemic risk. What this refers to is certain kinds of financial ‘products’ and practices that have often graced the headlines of late: credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and other kinds of credit derivatives.


The idea that the financial crisis has been caused by exotic new financial instruments—from credit derivatives to adjustable rate mortgages—has become part of the conventional wisdom. But is it true?


No doubt there is always a tendency to find fault in new practices that seem to be responsible for disasters, such as humbling the titans of finance with billions of dollars of losses, charmingly called ‘write-downs’. But how does that lead to systemic risk? If a large corporation (financial or otherwise) loses billions or even hundreds of billions, how does that threaten the system as a whole? Well, corporations often owe money to other corporations, and perhaps if a large lender goes under, other firms are placed at risk. That does indeed sound bad. But how is it different from the usual course of events? Companies rise and fall. Taking risks can lead to success or failure. When an idea leads to a failure, that strategy tends to be repeated less than those that are successful. A failure, even a large one, poses no threat to the system. Failures are an integral part of the system. Even the largest corporations are subject to market forces. And thank goodness for that. Big corporations must be exquisitely sensitive to quality and reputation, or else they are at risk of losing market share and potential takeover.


In the same way that nature rewards certain kinds of risks and penalizes others—successful strategies lead to greater propagation of a species—an evolutionary market-based process is the best enforcer of risk. The Fed or any regulator will always be 10 steps behind. Even if the government regulator happens to be on time, what should the penalty be? Will such penalties be subject to political forces—such as those that determined that Lehman should fail while Bear Stearns or AIG is rescued?


The nature of markets is the equalization of risk and return. Risky activities ought to have high returns, while less risky activities yield lower returns. Financial markets are filled with risky products that are hundreds of years old. Short-selling (the practice of borrowing shares in order to buy them back later, hopefully at a lower price) exposes the seller to potentially unlimited risk. Out of-the-money options that are close to expiration are also extremely risky. But these options are priced accordingly, not by government regulators, but by the market.


Yet even when markets are functioning well, it’s true there is a systemic risk lurking. At any moment, banks could collapse, for their reserves are only a tiny fraction of their deposits. Any threat to the banking sector sets off a damaging spiral: bank failure leads to bank runs, leading to loss of faith in banks, leading to further contraction in lending and paralyzing the conduit that runs from savings to investment.


This is why economists Kotlikoff and Leamer argue for a new financial architecture, one that does away with this source of systemic risk once and for all, while channelling society’s savings into investment, and providing prices for financial assets that correctly equalize risk and return. (See “A Banking System We Can Trust”, Forbes, 4/23/09). Their brilliant proposal would essentially to do away with the fractional reserve system. Unfortunately, this proposal has received little attention or discussion in the US. I get the sense we’re sick of the topic here. We’d rather believe in the green shoots that are supposedly sprouting. They say ‘less bad’ is the new ‘good’. My guess is that as the rally fades and new risks to the system are revealed, there will be an surge of interest in reforming the fractional reserve banking system, the source of systemic risk to the economy.

Thursday, May 28, 2009

Treasuries Crumple!


The price of the bellwether 10-year US Treasury note cratered yesterday, sending the yield skyrocketing.

This chart (^TNX) shows the yield of the 10 year US Treasury note. (As the price of a bond falls, the yield rises)

Look at the pattern of the last few days. The yield is up rather sharply. Keep in mind that this 10 year Treasury yield drives a lot of other interest rates, including mortgages. People often think that it's the Fed that controls interest rates. Not really. The Fed influences interest rates, and has been struggling to influence the yield on the 10 year US Treasury note, but the Fed is only one player in a big and very complex game. Sure, the Fed is one of the few players that can (semi) credibly print money at will, which is what they do when they want to push the 10 year Treasury yield down. They print money, then spend it buying Treasuries, which pushes prices up and yields down.

The Fed is losing a massive, behind-the-scenes battle. The Fed must keep this yield under control. But it must do it quietly. If investors get to thinking the Fed is the only buyer of Treasuries, they will sell, sending the price down even further. Also, it looks as though foreign central banks, which hold a lot of US Treasury debt, are starting to quietly edge toward the exit, and see the Fed's buying sprees as a good opportunity to sell off some of their holdings. The more money the Fed creates to manipulate markets, the more precarious becomes the state of the dollar, because it becomes more and more obvious that the plan is to inflate away the debt.

About the size of this market: check out the Treasury direct website. The total US Federal government debt is about $11.3 trillion. The US stock market, by comparison, is about $9.3 tril, as measured by the Wilshire 5000.

If money really begins to flee the US Treasury market, where will it go? Keep in mind that when someone sells a US Treasury note, they are paid in dollars. If the idea is to avoid the depreciation of the dollar, then the money must go into another currency or asset that is outside the ability of the Fed to depreciate. The obvious candidate is gold, but I expect we'll see continued movement into the Euro (note that the Euro is up strongly against the dollar recently, which tells us that many investors don't buy the rally. If the worst was over, why would the dollar be falling against the Euro?)

Monday, May 11, 2009

The Dollar


The financial system has weathered its greatest challenge in decades. The bear market has been as intense a decline as any since the Great Depression. (Yeah, I know, that comparison is getting to be a cliche.) But what hasn't happened is a fall in the value of the dollar. In fact, just the reverse has occurred. After years of swooning, the dollar had a sharp rise as the financial crisis hit.

The reason for the strength of the dollar was the process of deleveraging created an intense and immediate surge in demand for dollars. I think the deleveraging process has passed its first phase. The Fed has created trillions of dollars of new money, much of which has been absorbed into the financial system, into an immense hole of losses. But it has prevented insolvent firms from failing, and of course, each new dollar dilutes the value of the rest.

I think the end of the stock market rally may be caused by a fall in the value of the dollar. As the rally continues, stocks will climb "the wall of worry" until they fall, which I see happening around the 10,000 mark. We'll have to watch closely as the rally continues. Bear market rallies seem to go on much longer than you would think.