Showing posts with label economic stimulus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economic stimulus. Show all posts

Thursday, November 05, 2009

US GDP Swings to Growth

For the first time during this recession, US GDP is registering solid growth of 3.5% for Q3 of 2009.

Declining businesses inventories played a large role, but much of the growth was caused by increases in consumption spending: 40% of the increase in consumption was cars, driven by the cash-for-clunkers program, and another big slice was new home construction, driven by the $8,000 first time home buyer credit.

Those of us who were skeptical about these Federal programs to prop up consumption, may now be shown the rising GDP numbers as proof that these kind of government actions work. Well, yes, they work. But at what cost, and for how long? When the government borrows in order to give money to home buyers and car buyers, not only is that a dubious redistribution of resources, it causes a distortion in prices and in perceived demand. It causes sales from the future to happen in the present, inflating both automakers’ view of demand for cars and homebuilders’ view of demand for new homes.

It’s painfully obvious that the government cannot keep borrowing in order to funnel money toward consumption. When it ceases to do so, growth will fall, perhaps to negative territory.

Federal spending was up sharply, though state and local spending fell, due to declining revenues. States have a budget constraint that the Federal government doesn’t have.

Though the weakness in the dollar pushed up exports by 14.7%, imports increased by 16.4%, underscoring Americans’ addiction to low-priced foreign goods. The tendency to buy imports is true for cars as well as clothing and electronics: an often-overlooked feature of cash-for-clunkers was the fact that people often bought Hondas and Toyotas, which helps to stimulate Japan’s economy more than the US (with the exception of those Hondas and Toyotas produced in the US).

The Obama Administration claims the $160 billion that has been spent (of the $787 billion stimulus bill) has created or saved 640,329 jobs. Do the math: that’s $249,000 per job. That seems a bit expensive to me. For that price, we could’ve given 3.2 million Americans $50,000. Of course, the number of jobs ‘created or saved’ is already a bit dubious. Could it be that the government agencies who received stimulus funds had an incentive to say more jobs were ‘saved’ then actually was the case, to secure future stimulus funding? The Bureau of Labor Statistics doesn’t have a category for jobs saved, but it does have a category for net job creation, which has been massively negative for nearly 2 years, adding up to a total number of jobs lost of over 7.2 million. Given that the Bush administration also did a stimulus of $170 bil in Feb 2008, if $330 bil gives us only 640,329 jobs, how much would have to be spent to give us 7.2 million jobs? The answer is a staggering $3.6 trillion.

The reality is that the massive stimulus efforts have produced only small numbers of jobs, which have been swamped by the restructuring occurring throughout the economy. But such restructuring is necessary and unavoidable, and should be allowed to happen quickly rather than being dragged out through massive government consumption schemes.


Thursday, September 17, 2009

Stimulus Blues

I recently had the opportunity to take an unoffical poll of my economist colleagues a the City College of San Francisco, where I teach. One of the areas of very strong agreement was that the US dollar is the most serious risk to the US economy (there was one dissenter out of six economists). The other area of agreement was that the US needs another stimulus, on the order of $500 billion. Here, I was the lone dissenter. (Several of my colleagues didn’t feel another stimulus was politically feasible; I don’t think another stimulus is desirable economically.)

My colleagues are in good company; Paul Krugman, the 2008 Nobel prize-winner in economics has called for a second stimulus, as has Robert Reich and many others. A majority of economists were in favor of the first stimulus, though there were also some prominent dissenters. I think the views of economists tend to mesh with the conventional wisdom that the government has to do something.

The problem is that doing something is rarely a good substitute for doing the right thing.

Economics has largely scrapped the distinction between necessary and surplus value; necessary value is the portion of value that reproduces the capital and labor that went into producing a good or service, while surplus value is the additional value of the product above the cost of production. Without this key distinction, it becomes impossible to distinguish between economic activities which are productive (directly produce surplus value) and unproductive (those that do not); we’re left with only GDP numbers, without a notion of where the value flows came from.

To try to increase GDP without considering whether we’re increasing productive or unproductive economic activity is dangerous in an economy like the US, where unproductive activity has been steadily rising over the last 60 years. This rise has been financed by growing debt and capital inflows to the US economy, but as these flows slow, unproductive activity becomes less and less viable. To put it simply, the future of the US economy is in agriculture and manufacturing, not in finance, retail, or advertising. While there will always be a place for finance and other unproductive activities in the economy, it must be recalled that government is also an unproductive activity. As government spending increases, it absorbs a greater portion of the economy’s total surplus, at the very moment when that surplus is most needed to restructure, innovate, and re-invest. That is a recipe for a lingering malaise, such as what Japan experienced in the 1990s.

This is the time for government to cut back, do less and spend less, to balance the budget, and to trim taxes. In short, the government should take the advice given to a man in a small pond, thrashing about in an effort to make the muddy water clear:

Be still; it will happen best on its own.

Friday, August 07, 2009

What Will It Take to Pay Off the Federal Debt of the US?

The US is awash in debt on every level: Federal, state, local, as well as households and businesses. But for the private part of the economy, there is a different consequence for bankruptcy than for the public side. If a private individual or business goes under and fails to pay their bills, the creditors lose money, of course. But when a government goes under, it tends to go under in a way that inevitably affects everyone, for it devalues the currency.

Of course no government destroys its own currency with malice aforethought, but the pressures that come to bear on governments are such that destroying the currency seems at the time to be the right thing to do, given other options. Circumstances are already headed in that direction now, and pressure on the dollar continues to build in the face of rapidly expanding Federal debt.

The current Federal debt is $11,659 bil, and with the stimulus and other unfunded expansions in Federal spending, it’s widely believed to expand by at least another $1,800 bil in the next year alone, and to nearly double in ten years. It’s an open question as to how the Federal government expects to get the funding for that level of debt, as our foreign creditors are already reducing their purchases and seeking to ‘diversify’ their assets. China is inking trade agreements with Brazil and Argentina to conduct trade in the Renmimbi rather than in dollars. China is also channeling more of its massive currency hoard into durable commodities like copper, gold, and oil. Every day it seems, the discussion of the status of the dollar becomes a bit more open, a bit more honest, as countries seem to feel increasingly free to point out that the dollar’s days as the reserve currency of the world are numbered. Dollar-denominated Treasury debt is like a game of musical chairs: in the end, not everyone will get a seat.

In the past, the US has relied on economic growth to reduce its debt. Is that possible now? Total Federal government revenue was $2,554 bil in 2008. Let’s say that average rates of US growth resume immediately (3% per year) and continue indefinitely. Say that Federal revenue increases at the same pace. Say we immediately run surpluses, so that we can pay the interest on the debt plus an additional 1% of Federal revenue to pay the principle. (In 2008, that combination would cost $451 bil in interest plus $25 bil in principle, instead of the $458 bil deficit that actually occurred). Even with these rosy assumptions, it would take about 90 years to pay back the debt. Ninety years of solid economic growth and perfectly balanced budgets (plus the 1% surplus). No government on earth has such a record. (This analysis doesn’t include all the unseen obligations the US government has, such as Social security and Medicare, which add up to trillions more).

It seems likely that at some point, the United States’ largest creditors will demand repayment in some other form than dollars. Perhaps they would demand payment in their own currency, but that seems unlikely. The traditional asset for international settlements is gold, so gold is the most likely candidate, especially given that our two largest creditors, China and Japan, have relatively low gold reserves, while the US has the largest gold hoard in the world.

Let’s consider what would happen if the debt would have to be paid off in gold. According to the US Treasury (www.fms.treas.gov), the US government is in possession of 261,498,899 Troy ounces (8,133 tonnes) of gold, which at a gold price of $964, is worth $252 bil. The US gold stock is unaudited, and since it is also routinely leased to other parties, how much of it is owned free and clear by the government is unclear. The way that gold is leased is through a kind of repurchase agreement called a gold swap, which gives the US Treasury cash in exchange for a firm commitment to buy back the gold at a specified point in the future. For example, Goldman Sachs may give the US Treasury $1 bil today, using the gold as collateral, to receive $1.05 bil in one year, whereupon the gold reverts to the Treasury’s possession, though the gold has never left the vault. While 5% isn’t a great return, I’d say that Goldman can use the contract as an asset, since it’s backed by gold and the full faith of the US Treasury, which allows Goldman to obtain a risk-free return on the $1 bil, and still put the money to work in other ways to obtain returns.

The Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee (GATA) has estimated that the total amount of gold that is leased through gold swaps is between 12,000 and 15,000 tonnes, about half the total of all gold held by central banks. Individual nations don’t publish the extent of their gold swaps, but let’s say that half of the US Treasury’s gold has been leased, meaning that the gold is no longer an asset, but rather an obligation. If the Treasury really owns just half the gold in its possession, then it has about 131 mil Troy ounces of gold, worth $126 bil.

Now let’s imagine that a few of the large holders of US Treasury debt were to demand that the debt be repaid in gold rather than in dollars. The US Treasury holds its gold at a book value of $42.222 per Troy ounce, rather far below market prices. (If only one could buy a few ounces at that price!) Say that China and Japan (which own $1,477 bil) demand repayment in gold. Of course, these countries wouldn’t be so unreasonable as to ask for all the money all at once; let’s say they simply stop buying new debt, and ask for the interest on the debt outstanding to be paid in gold. If any large buyers were to stop or even slow their buying, yields would rise. Let’s say the yield rises only to the historical mean of about 6.5% (an event like this would probably push the yield far higher). At that yield, the interest would come to $96 bil a year, which would quickly drain the US Treasury’s entire gold stock. In fact, it would be gone in less than 18 months. If China and Japan started asking for gold, other countries would no doubt follow, as would large domestic holders, both institutional and individual. If the entire interest bill had to be paid in gold, it would come to $63 bil per month, and the Treasury would be out of gold in two months.

Now if there are no new buyers for Treasury debt, either the Federal government must immediately balance the budget, which seems unlikely, to put it mildly. More likely the Fed will step in and buy the debt directly, with money it conjures out of thin air. This leads to further depreciation of the dollar against gold, and would probably lead to a lot more demands for payment in gold, as creditors realize that their dollars will get less gold than before.

So we can’t grow our way out, and we can’t fall back on gold. The only other possible avenue is to depreciate the dollar. But how much depreciation would it take to reach the equilibrium that markets demand? If the situation arises where gold is sought for repayment rather than dollars, the question is, at what price? The US government will have give up the accounting fiction that the gold is worth $42.22 an ounce, and set an exchange rate between the dollar and gold. The rate chosen will not be below the market price, it will be well above the market price. How high is anyone’s guess—I’ll say $10,000 an ounce just to get the guessing started. This option allows the US to service its debt without the humiliation of an outright default, though it will still probably result in chaos, just as it did when the US last tried it, in 1933. It also creates a de facto gold standard. With gold at $10,000, the Treasury’s gold is worth $1,310 bil, and can now be used to pay the interest on the debt!

Where things go next is hard to foresee. But it’s clear that the debt is far too large to pay off, and that the United States’ creditors will demand payment in an asset that the US government can’t depreciate at will. The signal to investors is pretty clear: get out of Treasury debt and into gold. One way or another, the US will repudiate its debt. The other lesson is equally clear: the inevitable depreciation of the dollar simply follows the logic of the market, and cannot be denied by either money creation or fiscal stimulus.

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Robert Reich: "Double the Stimulus"

I like Robert Reich. He has a wonderful style of writing, at once assertive in his rhetoric and reasonable in his tone. In a recent blog post, (3/13/09) he calls for a new stimulus of roughly equal size to the last stimulus of $787 billion.

That is interesting. The President of the European Union, Czech PM Mirek Topolanek has just made headlines by calling the stimulus the way to hell. Topolanek argues that to ramp up spending during a recession is the wrong move. He's going against the grain, and since his center-right party just lost a vote of no confidence, he probably won't have much influence. It does seem like an unusually provocative statement.

Double the stimulus or road to hell?

In Marxian terms, this recession is all about what is called 'unproductive' economic activity, meaning labor which is not designed to produce value (i.e. activities which directly transform raw materials with labor in order to produce something which meets a human need). Unproductive activity is important, yet it does not directly produce an economic surplus (that amount which is produced which is greater than the needs of the direct producer). Over the last 60 years, the US economy has dramatically increased its unproductive activity, shown nicely in Measuring the Wealth of Nations, by Anwar Shaikh and E. Ahmet Tonak.

The activities of the Federal government, though important, are unproductive in the sense that they are not intended to produce a surplus. That means that government must be funded from a portion of the total surplus produced in the US. Since the crisis facing US capitalism is a crisis of unproductive activity, it cannot be solved by increasing the amount of unproductive activity.

In the years to come, we will see a return to productive economic activity: agriculture and manufacturing will once again dominate the US economy.

Friday, March 27, 2009

"No reputable economic forecaster is predicting a depression"

Says Edward Leamer, Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, on Marketplace. He sees no depression in the near future:
We've frightened consumers to the point where they imagine there is a good prospect of a Great Depression. That certainly is not the prospect. No reputable forecaster is producing anything like a Great Depression. So it's still OK if you spend a little bit. You do not have to put all your money into a mattress.
Dr. Leamer also sees the economy in a "healing cycle" by the second half of 2009, without "significant growth", but with fewer of the "large negatives" we've seen so far.

We shall see. I do not think that the errors and excesses of the boom years will be corrected by then. My guess is that the inflationary recession will continue for a period of years rather than quarters, particularly since government policy seems driven to prevent markets from reaching equilibrium, and the Fed is producing monumental amounts of new money, much of it secretively, off its balance sheet. Estimates of Fed off-balance sheet money creation are in the trillions of dollars.

Here are a few analyses of the magnitude of these Fed activities: ritholtz.com/blog, nowandfutures.com (this site also has a reconstruction of M3, the broad monetary aggregate that was discontinued by the Fed in 2006.)

Monday, March 23, 2009

The Architect of the Obama Stimulus Plan

Professor Bob Pollin, one of my old professors from the University of Massachusetts Amherst wrote an influential article in The Nation called How To End the Recession which had a big impact on the Obama Administration.
I have a lot of respect for Professor Pollin. He is the co-founder of the Political Economy Research Institute and a long-time advocate for working Americans. He is the author of Contours of Descent, a good book about the US economy during the 1990s. (Click here for a review I wrote of the book). Nonetheless I must differ with him that a stimulus of the kind and magnitude he offers will end the recession. (In the article, he calls for a stimulus of $300 bil, so that has been enthusiastically exceeded by the Obama Administration)

The recession will continue until all the disastrous business blunders that accumulated during the distortions of the boom years have been purged.

During a credit-fueled boom like the one we've just observed, the economy accumulates investment mistakes, due to the patterns that emerge that look sustainable but are not. For example, due to the easing of lending standards, the rate of homeownership rose from about 65% to nearly 70%. Millions more people owned homes than before. That incredible rise in real estate buying and selling fueled a boom in home construction. It is now abundantly clear that many of the new homeowners should not have purchased their homes. They did not have the income to purchase the home they did at that price.

All the economic activity that grew up around booming home prices now must be directed toward other ends. The number of realtors, which increased 50% (thanks to the Political Calculations blog for a nice analysis) from 2001 to 2006, must return to historical levels. Home construction must fall. Home prices must fall until they reach a level of historical affordability.
The reality is that an economic stimulus of $300 bil such as what Professor Pollin proposed, or the more ambitious version that the Obama Administration created will not encourage the kind of restructuring to which I refer above. Instead it will slow down the necessary adjustment, and add inflationary pressure to the mix.

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Economic Stimulus and the Banking Sector

The incoming Obama administration has been steadily increasing the size of the proposed economic stimulus, which now stands at $850 billion. Thus far, much of the debate has centered around the question of how big a stimulus ought to be, and what should be the mix of tax cuts versus government spending. This week, discussion has centered on what kind of spending would be desirable, and while the proposal of ‘green tech’ and repairing infrastructure is appealing, the criticism has been raised that since 97% of construction workers are male, and most are white, infrastructure projects leave out many of the most vulnerable poor, among them women and minorities.
The size of the stimulus will no doubt continue to grow as economic conditions worsen, particularly in the job market, where job losses appear to be accelerating, with 524,000 jobs lost last month. As for the overall effect of the stimulus package, Macroeconomic Advisers estimates that the Obama stimulus will increase GDP growth by 3.2%, and reduce unemployment by 1.7% by creating 3.3 million jobs.
Given the sudden reluctance of consumers to spend, it seems likely that the $275 billion portion of the stimulus package that is tax cuts will effectively disappear into savings or toward paying off household debt. But if lenders receive payment, they can make new loans, right?
I wonder. So far lending has fallen by $133 billion since October 2008, which means the money supply is contracting just as the stimulus is put in place, perhaps by as much as $1.33 trillion, assuming a money multiplier of 10. The big question is if banks continue to reduce their lending. It seems likely that banks will have reduced demand for loans without the mergers and acquisitions boom, and with de-leveraging occurring on all sides. If lending falls by another $100 billion in 2009, it means another $1 trillion decrease in the money supply, which would easily swamp the stimulus. This is one of the great weaknesses of the fractional reserve system: it tends to destroy money at exactly the wrong moment.
Think of the classical quantity theory of money: MV = PQ. The money supply is falling, and it seems likely that the velocity of money is also falling, as consumers spend less and save more. (It’s hard to measure the velocity of money directly, and it is typically inferred by measurements of the other variables.) This leads to falling prices and economic output. The adjustment process shouldn’t take long, if left alone: a year or two at most to purge failed ideas and business models, to de-leverage and move toward saving.
But of course it is hardly being left alone. Instead an ocean of money is being created and borrowed, all to prevent the natural adjustment of the economy back to a sustainable course. This adjustment cannot be prevented, though it may be delayed, it may be drawn out. The casualty of all this will be the US dollar, which is in its last days of being the world’s reserve currency.