Strong and Weak Money

Vietnam recently decided to depreciate their currency, the dong, by 5%, raising concerns throughout Asia about the possibility of competitive currency depreciations. Vietnam has a strong export sector, which is facing heavy competition from other Asian producers, including China and Thailand. If labor costs cannot go lower, if productivity cannot be raised, why not make Vietnam’s exports cheaper by simply making the dong worth less, meaning a dollar or Euro goes further than it did before.
The contradiction of Asia is that every country wants their currency to be strong and weak at the same time. Strong currencies are viewed as stable, and attract investment. Yet weak currencies allow the country to export goods that seem cheap in other countries.


How will China respond to this move? They might like to depreciate the Yuan, which has strengthened 17% against the dollar since 2002. After all, that would make their exports more competitive with Vietnam’s exports. China has been marked by a very slow and consistent approach to foreign exchange. There do not seem to be any sudden changes when it comes to policy about the value of the Yuan. It’s been assumed by most observers that the strategy is simply to capture the American market with low prices (which they know we can’t resist).


China’s goal may be far more ambitious: to create a new global reserve currency. Could the Chinese Yuan be a contender for that illustrious role? Such a possibility seems unfathomable. The natural contender to the dollar is clearly the Euro, the currency of the world’s largest trading economy, the Eurozone. After the Euro perhaps is the Yen. But China’s growth is far more vigorous than that of the Eurozone or Japan. Investors of all kinds want to get in on China’s growing markets, exchanging Euros or dollars for Yuan, which steadily pushes up the value of the Yuan. Since the Yuan is stable (and in fact, standing behind it is the largest currency reserve the world has ever seen), investors have faith it will keep its value.
What does China do with it’s growing foreign exchange surplus? It’s much more than they need to stabilize the Yuan’s value. They buy assets of real value: gold, copper, rare earth elements, stocks, real estate, and of course, government bonds, many of them US Treasurys. As long as China’s growth continues to be vigorous, the Chinese economy will draw in more and more outside capital. The lion’s share of the world’s Foreign Direct Investment is in the Eurozone, but utilized FDI in China has increased 10% a year since 1999, on average.


It’s unclear whether China’s goal can succeed. But they seem to be pursuing it with some vigor, and if they cannot be the world’s reserve currency, they can at least be part of a few key currencies, finally accepted as a great industrialized power. It seems increasingly clear that the US dollar will lose its spot on that list, particularly with the recent decision to commit even more troops to Afghanistan, which will add billions to the US fiscal hole.

Stimulus Blues

I recently had the opportunity to take an unoffical poll of my economist colleagues a the City College of San Francisco, where I teach. One of the areas of very strong agreement was that the US dollar is the most serious risk to the US economy (there was one dissenter out of six economists). The other area of agreement was that the US needs another stimulus, on the order of $500 billion. Here, I was the lone dissenter. (Several of my colleagues didn’t feel another stimulus was politically feasible; I don’t think another stimulus is desirable economically.)

My colleagues are in good company; Paul Krugman, the 2008 Nobel prize-winner in economics has called for a second stimulus, as has Robert Reich and many others. A majority of economists were in favor of the first stimulus, though there were also some prominent dissenters. I think the views of economists tend to mesh with the conventional wisdom that the government has to do something.

The problem is that doing something is rarely a good substitute for doing the right thing.

Economics has largely scrapped the distinction between necessary and surplus value; necessary value is the portion of value that reproduces the capital and labor that went into producing a good or service, while surplus value is the additional value of the product above the cost of production. Without this key distinction, it becomes impossible to distinguish between economic activities which are productive (directly produce surplus value) and unproductive (those that do not); we’re left with only GDP numbers, without a notion of where the value flows came from.

To try to increase GDP without considering whether we’re increasing productive or unproductive economic activity is dangerous in an economy like the US, where unproductive activity has been steadily rising over the last 60 years. This rise has been financed by growing debt and capital inflows to the US economy, but as these flows slow, unproductive activity becomes less and less viable. To put it simply, the future of the US economy is in agriculture and manufacturing, not in finance, retail, or advertising. While there will always be a place for finance and other unproductive activities in the economy, it must be recalled that government is also an unproductive activity. As government spending increases, it absorbs a greater portion of the economy’s total surplus, at the very moment when that surplus is most needed to restructure, innovate, and re-invest. That is a recipe for a lingering malaise, such as what Japan experienced in the 1990s.

This is the time for government to cut back, do less and spend less, to balance the budget, and to trim taxes. In short, the government should take the advice given to a man in a small pond, thrashing about in an effort to make the muddy water clear:

Be still; it will happen best on its own.