Friday, April 03, 2009

Did the Gold Standard Cause the Great Depression?

(I'll be out of town until 4/12, so I won't be blogging. Can you live without me?)

A fascinating 1997 paper by Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin argues that the gold standard caused the Great Depression. (Well, at least that the gold standard 'mentalite' was part of a set of factors that caused the Depression.) Eichengreen (UC Berkeley) and Temin (MIT) are top-notch economists; each has published a slew of articles on economic history. They represent the mainstream orthodox neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis on this point.

In this view, which is really more Keynesian than classical, sound money tends to tie the hands of government during a recession. Sound money is 'inelastic', you see, and cannot be made to do what government officials want it to do. The government often wants the impossible: lots of spending, while at the same time cutting taxes.

Eichengreen and Temin's paper is good to read alongside Murray Rothbard's America's Great Depression. (Freely available in its entirety at the previous link). Rothbard essentially argues the opposite: it was the rapid expansion of bank credit during the 1920s which caused the inevitable contraction in the money supply as banks rushed to cover; the government's response in the form of stimulus made things far worse by lengthening the time of adjustment.





Thursday, April 02, 2009

FASB Suspends Mark-to-market Accounting Rules

And the market loves it! The Dow is up 270 points as I write this. (Here's a link to a WSJ article on this development.)

Well, we should have known that with the steady drumbeat of analysis (examples here, here, and here) blaming the financial crisis on mark-to-market accounting that this would eventually happen.

Unbelievable. It is absolutely absurd to blame the financial crisis on mark-to-market accounting. What causes banks to suddenly realize that they have solvency problems is that they are insolvent every single day of every year; it's only that a dip in asset prices causes them to worry about it for the first time. Modern banks run on the fractional reserve system. During a credit boom, market competition pushes banks to decrease their reserve ratios, for this is key to higher profits. The Fed tends to look the other way as banks move assets around to avoid mandatory reserve requirements (either 10% or 3% depending on the size of the bank.) According to Fed data, aggregate bank reserves fell to 0.74% of bank deposits, showing that banks are adept at getting around mandated reserve ratios. (Reserves have exploded since the fall of 2008, showing the fear that has struck the banks.)

Allowing corporations more flexibility to value their assets (i.e. facilitating wishful thinking or outright deception) will not make this crisis go away, it will prolong it. The crisis will be over when markets clear. That requires accurate information, not opacity.

Krugman vs. Austrian View of Booms and Busts

Robert Murphy has an interesting blog post on the Austrian economic explanation for booms and busts. Austrian economics is based on the writings of Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Murray Rothbard.

This post is a critique of a recent post by Paul Krugman, who seems to intentionally misunderstand the views of other schools of thought in economics. Is it so difficult to understand each perspective and give it a fair hearing before attempting to refute it?

It seems this crisis may offer an opportunity to test which of the predictions from these schools of thought end up being more accurate: the Keynesian view, as seen in Paul Krugman's writings, or the Austrian view. For example, Krugman writes:
Just a quick note on the new, pessimistic CBO budget projections:
1. These projections have no bearing on the case for a large stimulus now — none. Adding, say, another $600 billion to stimulus spending would, on net, add around $400 billion to debt a decade from now (net is less than gross because the stimulus expands GDP, which leads to higher revenues that partly offset the initial outlay.)
This is a testable hypothesis. We shall see if it is the case that spending another $600 bil actually results in an addition of (only) $400 bil in debt in a decade.

Just to be fair, let me throw in my own prediction: this crisis will be a severe test of the Keynesian faith in monetary and fiscal stimulus, for neither one is capable of solving the problem. All indications point to an inflationary recession and stagnation, much like the Japanese experience of the 1990s. Of course, Japan did not have the world's reserve currency. We do, and we're tempted to use that power to inflate away our massive debts. I predict we will do so, like Roosevelt did in 1933 when he essentially defaulted on US debt by suspending the gold standard and devaluing the dollar by 41%.

Rather than saying, along with Krugman, that debt doesn't matter, we ought to be recognizing that expanding the Federal debt burden to finance an economic stimulus is exactly the wrong direction. We ought to trim spending and cut taxes, and get out of the way of the inevitable economic adjustment to equilibrium.

Wednesday, April 01, 2009

Amariglio vs. DeLong

Looking for an amusing diversion from the financial collapse?

Have a look at Brad DeLong's blog post from 2007 attempting to take David Ruccio and Jack Amariglio to task over the definition of postmodernism and its legacy. Did he even read their book Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics before attempting to teach them the meaning of the term 'postmodern'?

The amusing part is Amariglio's response. I have not seen such an erudite and proper public spanking in some time. It reminds me of Jim Cramer's recent treatment on the Daily Show. DeLong had nothing to say in response, because it is evident that he has only the most cursory exposure to the ideas he is attempting to discuss.

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Robert Reich: "Double the Stimulus"

I like Robert Reich. He has a wonderful style of writing, at once assertive in his rhetoric and reasonable in his tone. In a recent blog post, (3/13/09) he calls for a new stimulus of roughly equal size to the last stimulus of $787 billion.

That is interesting. The President of the European Union, Czech PM Mirek Topolanek has just made headlines by calling the stimulus the way to hell. Topolanek argues that to ramp up spending during a recession is the wrong move. He's going against the grain, and since his center-right party just lost a vote of no confidence, he probably won't have much influence. It does seem like an unusually provocative statement.

Double the stimulus or road to hell?

In Marxian terms, this recession is all about what is called 'unproductive' economic activity, meaning labor which is not designed to produce value (i.e. activities which directly transform raw materials with labor in order to produce something which meets a human need). Unproductive activity is important, yet it does not directly produce an economic surplus (that amount which is produced which is greater than the needs of the direct producer). Over the last 60 years, the US economy has dramatically increased its unproductive activity, shown nicely in Measuring the Wealth of Nations, by Anwar Shaikh and E. Ahmet Tonak.

The activities of the Federal government, though important, are unproductive in the sense that they are not intended to produce a surplus. That means that government must be funded from a portion of the total surplus produced in the US. Since the crisis facing US capitalism is a crisis of unproductive activity, it cannot be solved by increasing the amount of unproductive activity.

In the years to come, we will see a return to productive economic activity: agriculture and manufacturing will once again dominate the US economy.

Monday, March 30, 2009

Fed "Quarterbacking"

If you want something that will turn you against the study of monetary economics forever, read a series of experts debating what the Fed should've done and how what they did affected the economy. For example, The Wall Street Journal's recent symposium, Did Alan Greenspan Cause the Housing Bubble?

What a tiresome parade of simplistic reasoning and confusion, with the exception of Judy Shelton's piece, "Loose Money and the Derivative Bubble." (She has another great article published on 2/11 called Capitalism Needs a Sound-Money Foundation. (Ms. Shelton is the author of Money Meltdown, which I confess I have not yet read.)

To blame the Chair of the Fed for supposedly disastrous Fed policies is "quarterbacking", as in, how might have that game played out if the quarterback had acted differently? A speculative exercise at best, quarterbacking ignores the interconnected nature of events, supposing that we could go back in time and change one thing, leaving all other things unchanged.

The other problem with Fed quarterbacking is that the Fed is in an impossible position. The Fed's stated mission is to maintain price stability, full employment, and financial stability. Each of these is a sham. Price stability? The Fed issues a fiat currency, and has recently increased the number of Federal Reserve Notes (aka dollars) by several trillion (most of it in electronic form). The Fed is the primary engine of inflation, not price stability.

That the Fed can use wise monetary stimulus to ensure full employment is Keynesian dogma, and it's more or less true during the credit-fueled boom. But when that boom ends, as it must, the Fed becomes ineffective, for the contraction in bank lending tends to counteract the Fed's lowering of the interbank lending rate. This is where we are now, and the Fed's efforts to re-inflate the bubble are likely to create inflation, which will surely interfere with the economic adjustments necessary to begin recovery.

As for financial stability, the Fed presides over a fractional reserve banking system, which is inherently unstable. Like building on a river delta, a flood will periodically come and wash out the banking system, causing banking failures and bank runs, which the system cannot endure.

The housing bubble isn't Alan Greenspan's fault. But it is the fault of the Fed system, which generates credit bubbles which must inevitably pop. Greenspan should've known better. He has long advocated the gold standard. But he just did what everyone wanted him to do: he spiked the punch so we could all get drunk at a decades-long party. Now we're sobering up and cursing the man who sold us the drinks we demanded.

Friday, March 27, 2009

"No reputable economic forecaster is predicting a depression"

Says Edward Leamer, Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, on Marketplace. He sees no depression in the near future:
We've frightened consumers to the point where they imagine there is a good prospect of a Great Depression. That certainly is not the prospect. No reputable forecaster is producing anything like a Great Depression. So it's still OK if you spend a little bit. You do not have to put all your money into a mattress.
Dr. Leamer also sees the economy in a "healing cycle" by the second half of 2009, without "significant growth", but with fewer of the "large negatives" we've seen so far.

We shall see. I do not think that the errors and excesses of the boom years will be corrected by then. My guess is that the inflationary recession will continue for a period of years rather than quarters, particularly since government policy seems driven to prevent markets from reaching equilibrium, and the Fed is producing monumental amounts of new money, much of it secretively, off its balance sheet. Estimates of Fed off-balance sheet money creation are in the trillions of dollars.

Here are a few analyses of the magnitude of these Fed activities: ritholtz.com/blog, nowandfutures.com (this site also has a reconstruction of M3, the broad monetary aggregate that was discontinued by the Fed in 2006.)

Thursday, March 26, 2009

Webcast with Karl Case "The Economy and the Housing Crisis"

I got an invitation from Pearson, one of the textbook publishers that is always trying to sell me their texts, to participate in a live webcast with Karl E. Case, Professor of Economics at Wellesley College and founding partner of the real estate research firm Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss, which produces the S&P Case Shiller Index. The Case Shiller Index is, in my view, the best of the real estate indices.

If you want to check it out, it's March 31st, 12-1 EST.


They want you to register first.

I'm interested because Karl Case has said housing has hit bottom, and I'd like to know his reasons. There will be a Q&A after the talk, so I'll report back on it.

Outrage Over AIG Bonuses

It's been interesting to watch the back-and-forth over the $165 mil in bonuses to the AIG execs and financial wunderkinds in the division that wrecked the company.

On the one side, AIG is like, well, we're still in business, so it's business as usual. The "performance" part of the bonuses was based on a Panglossian assessment of the profitability of the credit default swaps. (Jack Adamo of Forbes has a nice article on this.)

It sure makes the government look bad to be completely behind the curve on this. Congress knew about the bonuses for months, but only acts once the public gets upset.

Is AIG stock a candidate for a short sell? I'd say so. The stock more than tripled in price recently, going from a low of $0.35 to a high of $1.28 today. The short interest is currently 5.9%.

A former student sent me a note asking about AIG - is it a good idea to invest in it, since it seems like the government is behind it, so it can't fail, right? I said it was extremely speculative, since AIG is sitting on God-knows-how-much in liabilities, but in the short term, I expect the stock to rally to $1, making it a good play if you have the stomach for the risk.

At this point, I expect the rally to take the Dow to 8300 before resuming its downward course, and I expect AIG will be punished by the market soon.

And yes, I try to only list my good calls...

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

Should We Cap Interest Rates?

A new article in Harper's Magazine (subscriber only, but here is an interview where he gives the main points) by Thomas Geoghegan offers an interesting solution to the problem of financial collapse: cap interest rates.

His argument is provocative: by deregulating interest rates, we encouraged the massive growth of the financial sector, for the simple reason that capital can obtain much higher rates of return through lending consumers money at high interest rates than it can get in, say, manufacturing. Securitization separated the lender from the owner of the debt, which created an incentive for lenders to engage in misleading practices and really sell the idea of debt to consumers. The average working family got killed by higher and higher interest rates.

He's right about so much of this that I find it frustrating that he arrives at the conclusion of capping interest rates.

Yes, the growth of the financial sector was because of higher profit rates; yes, securitization separates lender from owner of debt, creating some bad incentives; and yes, the average household is getting killed by high interest rates. But to cap interest rates would simply mean that much of the lending to consumers would simply dry up or be driven underground at much higher interest rates. (The classic deal with a loan shark is "a point a week", or 52% yearly interest.)

High adjustable-rate interest is simply the market's response to inflation. Eliminate the inflation, and you will eliminate high interest rates. Indeed, the sooner the market correctly prices the asset-backed securities that are based on debt, the better, because that will be the day when this scheme is finally buried once and for all.

To get the government involved in this process would be a mistake. Government-based pricing does not tend to produce good outcomes, it tends to produce shortages and surpluses.

Monday, March 23, 2009

The Architect of the Obama Stimulus Plan

Professor Bob Pollin, one of my old professors from the University of Massachusetts Amherst wrote an influential article in The Nation called How To End the Recession which had a big impact on the Obama Administration.
I have a lot of respect for Professor Pollin. He is the co-founder of the Political Economy Research Institute and a long-time advocate for working Americans. He is the author of Contours of Descent, a good book about the US economy during the 1990s. (Click here for a review I wrote of the book). Nonetheless I must differ with him that a stimulus of the kind and magnitude he offers will end the recession. (In the article, he calls for a stimulus of $300 bil, so that has been enthusiastically exceeded by the Obama Administration)

The recession will continue until all the disastrous business blunders that accumulated during the distortions of the boom years have been purged.

During a credit-fueled boom like the one we've just observed, the economy accumulates investment mistakes, due to the patterns that emerge that look sustainable but are not. For example, due to the easing of lending standards, the rate of homeownership rose from about 65% to nearly 70%. Millions more people owned homes than before. That incredible rise in real estate buying and selling fueled a boom in home construction. It is now abundantly clear that many of the new homeowners should not have purchased their homes. They did not have the income to purchase the home they did at that price.

All the economic activity that grew up around booming home prices now must be directed toward other ends. The number of realtors, which increased 50% (thanks to the Political Calculations blog for a nice analysis) from 2001 to 2006, must return to historical levels. Home construction must fall. Home prices must fall until they reach a level of historical affordability.
The reality is that an economic stimulus of $300 bil such as what Professor Pollin proposed, or the more ambitious version that the Obama Administration created will not encourage the kind of restructuring to which I refer above. Instead it will slow down the necessary adjustment, and add inflationary pressure to the mix.

Sunday, March 22, 2009

A Prediction for the Dow

In the spring of 2006, my father and I predicted a financial crisis would hit the US. (We assumed that this crisis would be driven by dollar depreciation, which has not yet occurred). We continue to feel strongly that the dimensions of the coming crisis are still not grasped by most Americans. In January 2008, I predicted the Dow would fall to 7000. Given what has now occurred, our concerns were mild. Yes, an estimated $60 tril of paper wealth has been destroyed globally, but there is much more to come.
Over the next five or ten years, the US will sink into a deep recession. Unemployment will rise dramatically as the restructuring of the American economy proceeds. We see the Dow falling to 400. Yes, four hundred.
Given the endless parade of bad news and bearish forecasts for the economy, it may seem that the worst has already happened, and there is nowhere to go but up. Indeed, some analysts (for example here and here) have called a market bottom. The US consumer is not spending, unemployment is rising, the highest officeholders in the land call it the worst situation since the Great Depression... you might say, how many other shoes are there waiting to drop (or be thrown)?
What has not yet occurred is a serious threat to the dollar's status as the world's reserve currency. That threat will come, for the world cannot continue to finance American profligacy. When the eventual flight from the dollar occurs, it will cause much worse damage even than the unbelievable carnage in asset prices (click here for a chart of the Dow over the last year) we've already seen.

Tuesday, March 17, 2009

Stewart vs. Cramer: Short Selling Backlash

[Written for the Borsen-Kurier]
Judging from the cable news cycle, the most important story of the last week in the US was a face-off between Jon Stewart, comedian and host of The Daily Show (you can watch the show here), Comedy Central’s fake news network, and Jim Cramer, a former hedge fund trader and host of CNBC’s Mad Money. How did it happen that arguably the most serious journalist in the US, virtually the only interviewer who is willing to ask truly tough questions, is a comic specializing in, as he puts it, “fart jokes”?
Stewart played a clip from the end of 2006, which showed Cramer being interviewed and revealing some of his secrets of short selling: “You want to spread rumors about the company,” he said, “it’s against the rules, but the SEC won’t find out.” After the clip, Stewart says: “I want the Jim Cramer on CNBC to protect me from that Jim Cramer.” Cramer squirmed and capitulated, trying to make it seem that he’s doing everything he can to prevent the kind of abuses he’s just been shown to be adept at, and promising to do a better job as a financial reporter. “That would be great,” said Stewart, pressing on, “but this is about more than you.” It’s about the network, the show, the whole focus on short-term gain at the expense of the little guy, about gaming the system, about the average investor “capitalizing your adventure”.
He’s right, of course, in that financial markets can function like a poker game. As Warren Buffett put it, if you’ve been playing poker for half an hour and you don’t know who the sucker is, it’s you. Shows like Mad Money are designed to draw in more suckers, who then make amateurish blunders, which the pros exploit.
What should be done?
It doesn’t seem to make much sense to try to ban rumor-mongering. But should we ban or try to restrict short-selling? Has short-selling caused the financial meltdown? Short-selling is the practice of borrowing shares, selling them, then waiting for a lower price, which allows the investor to buy back the shares, and return them to the lender, pocketing the difference. The practice of short-selling is having its 400th anniversary this year, and it remains controversial, because it puts the investor in the position of hoping for a decline, and for the last 400 years, short sellers have been blamed for causing markets to fall.
But such a position is untenable. Though it is true that every short sale begins with selling, and each act of selling exerts downward pressure on a stock, the number of short sellers in a market tends to be small, and short sellers tend to be professional (or at least experienced) traders.
Because markets tend to price in available information, rumors cannot bring prices down for long. If a stock is undervalued by the market, its price will eventually rise, just as overvalued stocks will fall. Short sellers do a valuable service by putting pressure on overvalued stocks. Either the shorts are correct, and the stock falls back to a lower value, or the shorts are wrong, in which case they lose money. There is no more effective discipline for traders than losing money. Blaming short-sellers for falling stock prices is like blaming a vulture for the death of a zebra. A vulture is incapable of killing a zebra, but the vulture obviously benefits from the zebra’s death; the rest of the ecosystem benefits from the vulture stripping the carcass.
Short selling did not cause the US stock market to fall. The stock market fell because it had reached a monumentally overvalued condition. To restrict short selling not only locks the barn after the horse is gone, it discourages traders from taking positions which correct overvalued prices.

Monday, March 16, 2009

Weakness = Strength? Lasting Prosperity Cannot Occur Through Currency Depreciation

[Written for the Borsen-Kurier]
Perhaps the most under-reported story in the US is one that hints at the future of the dollar: China plans a technical change in the way international transactions are made by its multinational corporations, allowing these transactions to be settled in its own currency, the Yuan, rather than in dollars, Euros, or another ‘hard’ currency. Though the move does not affect the exchange rate between the Yuan and the US dollar, it is a move that undermines the dollar’s reserve currency status; No doubt China would like to put the Yuan in the dollar’s place.
These days a curious idea seems to hold sway: that a country can get economic growth by destroying its own money. Currency Depreciation Can Spur Boom In Exports, Lead to Economic Recovery, reads the subtitle of a recent Wall Street Journal article, which cites the US in 1933 and the Asian tigers (and Russia) during the 1990s. All of these economies supposedly reached prosperity through reducing the value of their currencies.
The US accuses China of holding the Yuan ‘artificially low’, giving Chinese products an unfair advantage in the US market. As the US dollar weakens against the Euro, and the unwinding of the Yen carry trade causes the Yen to strengthen, Europe and Japan can no longer count on exports to the US to produce growth.
Each country wants their currency to be both strong and weak at the same time, as weakness helps exports, while strength leads to increases in foreign investment and the ability to issue bonds at attractive rates.
Since we live in a world of fiat money, where the value of a currency depends on little more than the resolve of central banks to defend it using their foreign exchange reserves coupled with their reticence (or lack thereof) to create more money, weakening a currency against the US dollar simply requires the rate of money creation be greater than the rate of growth of the US money supply.
Clearly, the entire world cannot employ this strategy. There must be some anchor. That anchor, of course, has been the US dollar for the last 60 years. But now the US wants to play the same game; but how can the world’s reserve currency survive a regime of massive indebtedness? As the dollar fades, some of the benefit of a reserve currency may also be lost: the anchor that helped world trade flourish during the eras of Bretton Woods I (1945-1971) and what some have called ‘Bretton Woods II’ (1971-present) will be lost. Will the distrustful beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies of an earlier era return? It seems likely that there will be a period of chaos which will disrupt global trade until a suitable substitute is found. There is one choice for a medium to conduct international settlement that is widely seen as ‘the gold standard’, which is… uh… the gold standard.

Monday, February 16, 2009

What Caused the Housing Crash?

“Problems started at the household level, with poorly-designed mortgage products”, claims Elizabeth Warren, professor of law and member of the newly-formed Financial Products Safety Commission. According to this view, the US housing bubble, where prices of homes increased 125% from 2000 to 2006, was the result of shoddy products sold to an unsuspecting public. Like the general claim of ‘predatory lending’ such a view assumes that people need a government agency to protect them from making bad decisions.
The fall in home prices, which began in 2006 and continues, has so far wiped out perhaps $10 trillion in value. If only there had been some government agency providing oversight, all of this may have been averted, Warren suggests. But there was. It’s called the Federal Reserve. But the Fed did nothing to avert the housing bubble—in fact, former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan made public statements urging people to buy homes with adjustable rate mortgages. What a spectacle: the nation’s foremost economist urging people to commit financial hari-kari.
Sure, there were ‘toxic mortgages’, to use a recently-coined term which seems to have caught on. Mortgage brokers aggressively sold them to people. People were encouraged to lie about their income and assets and they did so eagerly, to get their piece of the American dream: their own home. Fraud and deception proliferate in an atmosphere of denial. Home prices will always go up; you’ll be able to re-finance later at low rates, an army of mortgage brokers said.
But to say the current crisis is the result of bad mortgages is to employ a circular logic. Why did these mortgage products spread and gain dominance? Why did they displace the traditional banker’s strategy of lending conservatively to qualified borrowers? The reason is that the creation of toxic mortgages is the result of the same force that produced the rapid growth in hedge funds, credit-default swaps and other financial derivatives, and massive increases in trading volumes: money creation. Money created out of thin air always creates inflation. But when the price being inflated is a home, it seems to cause a special kind of madness that does not result from the inflation of other prices, like food, gasoline, or medical care.
Money creation is itself the product of two forces: the fractional reserve banking system, and the desire of the government to run large, continuing deficits, which are partly financed by slowly depreciating the currency through inflation. The change in bank policy which made toxic mortgages possible was a relatively new practice of moving money into new categories (such as repos, Eurodollars, collateralized debt obligations, and others) which allowed banks to circumvent the Fed’s required reserve ratio (which ranges from 10% for larger banks to 3% for smaller ones). As the result of this shell game, the actual reserve ratio in US banks fell to an incredible 0.74% at its trough—that’s $0.74 for each $100 deposited (this ratio has since risen, as banks are now in panic mode).
The Fed, which, after all keeps the statistics on bank deposits and lending, certainly must have known, but opted to look the other way. The rewards to financial ‘innovation’ of this kind were great, and the riskier banks bought those who employed more traditional strategies. Mortgage lending became so profitable that banks specialized in it, eschewing deposits altogether, instead obtaining funding by selling the mortgages as securities and making more loans, always more loans.
Given that the housing bubble was caused by money creation, it would be simply silly to think that some commission assigned to prevent bad mortgage products will have an impact. The solution to future asset bubbles is clear: abolish fractional reserve banking.

Thursday, January 22, 2009

What Caused the Stock Market Crash of 2008-2009?

[Written for the Borsen-Kurier]
What caused the US stock market to spectacularly crash in 2008 is intimately connected to what caused the market to boom from 1980 to 2007. In broad terms, the long market boom, which took the Dow from 875 to over 14,000 at its peak in the fall of 2007, was the result of two interconnected forces: money creation and redistribution.
Economically, the great puzzle to solve is not why the market crashed, but why it performed so far above the rate of economic growth for so long. Why should the stock market, which is composed of nothing more than a broad section of corporations, on average perform any better than the overall rate of economic growth, upon which it surely rests?
Consider the following graph of the stock market and M3, the Federal Reserve’s broadest measure of money creation (M3 was discontinued in 2006, but the series is kept up by several different private economists). Notice that the performance of the stock market (as measured by the Dow) is far above the rate of productivity growth or the rate of real economic growth.

The fractional reserve nature of most modern banking systems means that money creation takes place in a decentralized manner; during this period, much of that money found its way into financial markets, in the form of leveraged buyouts, stock buybacks, and the effects of increasing leverage on the part of investment banks and the explosive growth of the highly-leveraged hedge fund industry. Much of this borrowing went to purchase equities, bidding up prices dramatically.
At the same time, the shifting balance of power between labor and capital made it possible for corporations to hold down wage growth, resulting in an unprecedented 20 year period of falling real wages in the US. This caused corporate profits to increase, along with share prices, as stockholders re-evaluated the new distribution of income between labor and capital.
The problem, of course, is that neither of these forces are sustainable. The share of income going to labor can fall, allowing the share that goes to profits to rise, but labor’s share cannot fall far without producing resistance. In the US, that resistance was weak, in part because of a new innovation: leverage for consumers. Unfortunately, the new kinds of consumer credit that were invented and eagerly used by US consumers were rarely used for any kind of investment, so debts mounted without an increase in income to pay them back.
As for money creation, it must eventually lead to inflation. No one can truly create wealth out of thin air, so when money is created far in excess of economic growth it must cause rising prices somewhere. If it causes rising consumer prices, we notice it and demand a solution, but if it causes rising stock prices, we celebrate it. But the money is not real, and the prices cannot last. At this point, it seems likely that the Dow will fall to 5500, which would give the Dow a traditional bear market dividend yield of 6%. Given the extent of money creation thus far, a strong possibility is that the Dow shows strong growth, perhaps rising above 10,000, or even above its record heights. While this may reassure investors, such an outcome would simply be the first manifestation of inflation that will not be confined to financial markets this time around.

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Economic Stimulus and the Banking Sector

The incoming Obama administration has been steadily increasing the size of the proposed economic stimulus, which now stands at $850 billion. Thus far, much of the debate has centered around the question of how big a stimulus ought to be, and what should be the mix of tax cuts versus government spending. This week, discussion has centered on what kind of spending would be desirable, and while the proposal of ‘green tech’ and repairing infrastructure is appealing, the criticism has been raised that since 97% of construction workers are male, and most are white, infrastructure projects leave out many of the most vulnerable poor, among them women and minorities.
The size of the stimulus will no doubt continue to grow as economic conditions worsen, particularly in the job market, where job losses appear to be accelerating, with 524,000 jobs lost last month. As for the overall effect of the stimulus package, Macroeconomic Advisers estimates that the Obama stimulus will increase GDP growth by 3.2%, and reduce unemployment by 1.7% by creating 3.3 million jobs.
Given the sudden reluctance of consumers to spend, it seems likely that the $275 billion portion of the stimulus package that is tax cuts will effectively disappear into savings or toward paying off household debt. But if lenders receive payment, they can make new loans, right?
I wonder. So far lending has fallen by $133 billion since October 2008, which means the money supply is contracting just as the stimulus is put in place, perhaps by as much as $1.33 trillion, assuming a money multiplier of 10. The big question is if banks continue to reduce their lending. It seems likely that banks will have reduced demand for loans without the mergers and acquisitions boom, and with de-leveraging occurring on all sides. If lending falls by another $100 billion in 2009, it means another $1 trillion decrease in the money supply, which would easily swamp the stimulus. This is one of the great weaknesses of the fractional reserve system: it tends to destroy money at exactly the wrong moment.
Think of the classical quantity theory of money: MV = PQ. The money supply is falling, and it seems likely that the velocity of money is also falling, as consumers spend less and save more. (It’s hard to measure the velocity of money directly, and it is typically inferred by measurements of the other variables.) This leads to falling prices and economic output. The adjustment process shouldn’t take long, if left alone: a year or two at most to purge failed ideas and business models, to de-leverage and move toward saving.
But of course it is hardly being left alone. Instead an ocean of money is being created and borrowed, all to prevent the natural adjustment of the economy back to a sustainable course. This adjustment cannot be prevented, though it may be delayed, it may be drawn out. The casualty of all this will be the US dollar, which is in its last days of being the world’s reserve currency.

Sunday, November 30, 2008

Solving the US Banking Crisis

[Written for the Borsen-Kurier]

Most efforts proposed these days go exactly the wrong direction: back toward unsustainable economic activity like debt-funded consumer spending, home buying, and government spending, or away from the transparency that markets need to reach equilibrium (for example, the recent proposal at the G-20 meeting that accounting standards be ‘temporarily’ loosened—as if we could escape our problems through denial).

Here is an economic plan that would work immediately; it would stabilize the banking sector instantly, preventing the crisis in the stock market from reducing business investment in the real economy, thus preventing a major contraction of GDP.

The catch? It will involve some short-term economic pain.

The reason that banks are fragile is that they have only a fraction of their deposits on hand at any given time. Because banks are currently scrambling to increase their reserves, they have restricted lending by $100 bil from October 29th to November 19th. Granted, this is a small decrease when the total volume of loans is over $7,000 bil, but any decrease in lending tends to be pro-cyclical, resulting in the contraction of the money supply at precisely the wrong time. In theory, a money multiplier of 10 would imply that a $100 bil restriction in lending would lead to money destruction of $1,000 bil. Additionally, because of decreased consumption and investment spending, there is a falling velocity of money, meaning fewer transactions per week. This exacerbates the effect of a contraction in the money supply. As of November 28th, 2008, the total money supply (M2) was $7,854 bil. Bank reserves have skyrocketed from $44 bil in August to $652 bil in October, while bank deposits have stayed constant at about $7,000 bil.

Here’s the plan, in two parts.

Part 1: the total cash and coin in the US is less than $800 bil. Print an additional $7,000 bil, and give it to banks in exact proportion to their deposits. Then make sure that bank reserves always equal bank deposits, creating a 100% reserve system. This would cause no net change in the money supply, for we’d simply have printed money to back up bank deposits, money that was already in use. We’d merely replace checkbook-money with paper money. No problem so far. There would be no inflationary pressure, and the cost would be minimal - the cost of printing and distributing the money.

Part 2: Define the dollar as a portion of gold. This is where the sacrifice begins, for it involves a substantial devaluation of the dollar. The US holds 8.133 bil grams of gold, and the IMF has another 3.217 bil grams; if we divide the total money supply M2 by the total US and IMF gold reserves, we get about $700 per gram, meaning a dollar is worth 1/700th of a gram. Now the tough part: we keep this ratio in good times and bad, at all times allowing anyone to trade $700 for a gram of gold. Since the current market price of gold is about $26 per gram, this plan would entail that the dollar must fall to 3.7% of its current value. (The drop would probably be less severe, as this plan would pull gold out of private gold stocks and into service as money).

The sacrifice would begin when all imported goods immediately rise in price dramatically (an imported good that costs $1 may rise to $25). International trade flows would change as markets reach equilibrium. This would certainly cause some dislocation. But we’d skip the lasting pain of a sequel to the Great Depression because the main damage to the economy would be avoided. The money supply would not contract due to banks rational fear of collapsing during the financial crisis. Banks would be on a solid basis, and they could immediately begin lending (from savings accounts only; these would have to be set aside specifically for investment purposes, and would no longer be available on demand).

Sacrifices would continue as the US could no longer maintain a current account deficit without draining US gold reserves. The federal government would not be able to borrow billions or trillions to finance deficit spending. The depreciation of the dollar would mean foreign bond holders would immediately lose money, and large-scale selling of bonds would ensue. While it is unfortunate to break the trust of those who bought US bonds, it is simply unavoidable. The US has too much debt to pay it back. The US government will repudiate its debt, either simply and honestly, as in this plan, or covertly, through inflation.

Without access to deficit spending, cuts in government spending will add to the economic contraction, but the plan will prevent future pain, for the current strategy of massive money creation and fiscal deficits will surely devalue the dollar, without the benefit of ever leading to a sound medium of exchange.

The financial crisis is first and foremost a debt-deflation crisis, which was produced by banks’ wanton money creation during the expansion of the 1990s and early 2000s (an expansion supervised by the Federal Reserve). If we give the market a medium of exchange that can be trusted to hold its value, the extraordinary ingenuity and entrepreneurship that is America’s greatest asset will be unleashed, and we will soon be enjoying prosperous times again.

Saturday, November 22, 2008

Inflation-Deflation Seesaw

[A piece for the Austrian paper Borsen-Kurier]
The big news from America is President Obama: a truly great man has been elected president, and he did it in spite of his race and unusual name. It is a great moment for America. President-elect Obama faces a global economy that is more tightly interlinked than ever before, and so trends that emerge in the US (and elsewhere) have global ramifications.
The US Producer Price Index has been falling for 3 straight months: down 2.8% in October, 0.4% in September, and 0.9% in August. The PPI doesn’t reflect the plummeting asset prices in financial markets (the Dow is down 40%) and real estate (down 20% nationwide, according to the Case Shiller index). There is considerable downward pressure on nearly every asset class worldwide, and it seems likely that commodity deflation will continue for at least several more months.
Of course, the central banks of the world are working overtime to combat deflation; the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have borrowed or created nearly $3 trillion out of thin air this year alone. As that new money is absorbed and digested by markets, it will eventually cause inflation. Certainly the announcements of the G-20 meeting, with its statement that the world should work together to re-inflate sagging markets, is also inflationary.
By the current rules of the game, no country that relies on exports to fuel its growth can afford an appreciating currency against the dollar, for the strengthening of the currency would hurt sales in the US and every other country that maintains a dollar peg, which includes some pretty big markets, as well as some high growth markets, such as China. This means that when the US creates dollars, other countries rush to weaken their currencies. With a worldwide crash in equities, countries are not exactly reluctant to create money and funnel it into financial markets, but at some point, this will catch up with commodities again, and we’ll see a resumption of global commodity inflation, which is likely to accelerate.
The US bond market is currently pricing in low inflation over the long term. Indeed, for a time the inflation protected Treasury bonds (TIPS) had a higher yield than the nominal 10-year Treasury bond, meaning that the bond market predicts deflation. But what will happen when the money creation returns to markets in the form of inflation? Bond yields will have to rise, to compensate for inflation, leading to broad-based increases in interest rates across the economy; even though the Federal funds rate is likely to be low, I bet we’ll see high interbank lending rates, with the consequence of rising rates for consumer credit, and rising rates for corporate bonds as well.
There is no easy way out of this, but President-elect Obama has already done one good thing: reminded America that there will be sacrifices ahead. I think we can make sacrifices, if there is an understanding that it’s for a good reason, and it will help to eventually restore solid economic growth.

Monday, October 27, 2008

The US economy has been slowing for some time (the average real growth of GDP from 1980-2005 was 3.01%, while it was 3.95% from 1950-1979), as the economy has shifted more toward finance, insurance, real estate, advertising, and retail. These activities are economically unproductive, meaning they do not directly result in fundamental value creation in the economy (even though they increase GDP). This growth in the unproductive economy creates a drag on the US economy, making it more vulnerable to the financial crisis. Over the long term, the US economy will shift back toward productive activities, like manufacturing and agriculture.
If the economy has been hollowed out by its turn toward economically unproductive activities, why has the stock market seen an incredible run since 1980, with the broad Wilshire 5000 up 1025% at its peak in 2007? For the answer, follow the money.
Specifically, follow the mountains of cash that have been created out of thin air; not just in the last year, when the Federal Reserve has found all sorts of novel ways to pump nearly $1 trillion to investment banks and other firms in a massive effort to re-inflate markets. For the entire period since 1980, broad money creation (M3) has increased 8% per year. You can’t create money on this scale without seeing some inflation, either in consumer prices, or in assets (like stocks and real estate), or both.
Before a tsunami, the sea recedes, exposing the ocean floor and making a sucking noise; then the great wave hits. The US and global financial crisis is in the sucking phase right now, sucking away all the money that has been shoveled into it, but the next phase is certain to be highly inflationary, as the consequences of decades of money creation manifest.
It is particularly interesting then that we begin to see the first call for a new ‘financial order’ from French President Nicholas Sarkozy. The French have a long tradition of chafing under the international rule of the dollar, and my guess is that Sarkozy is seeking to position the Euro as the emerging reserve currency. In the short term, the dollar will continue to attract investors seeking a safe haven from global turmoil in financial markets. But as the crisis fades and the US economy continues to deteriorate while the Federal government continue to pile up huge deficits, investors will look for a stable currency for international transactions.
In the US, most people are looking for the leader who will ‘fix’ the economy: stop foreclosures, get home prices back to rising 15% per year, get gas prices, food prices, and unemployment down, etc. Not all of these things can be done. We got ourselves into this by thinking we could spend all we wanted and pay it back later, and, though it will be a difficult adjustment to make, it will ultimately be better for the world without the US as the ‘spender of last resort’.